SOME THEOREMS ON DEFINABILITY AND DECIDABILITY
ALONZO CHURCH and w. v. QUINE 1. Reducibility of numerical relations to symmetric ones. In this paper a theorem about numerical relations will be established and shown to have certain consequences concerning decidability in quantification theory, as well as concerning the foundation of number theory. The theorem is that relations of natural numbers are reducible in elementary fashion to symmetric ones; i.e.:
THEOREM I. For every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that R is definable in terms of H plus just truth-junctions and quantification over natural numbers.
To state the matter more fully, there is a (well-formed) formula 4 of pure quantification theory, or first-order functional calculus, which meets these conditions :
(a) 4 has 'x' and 'y' as sole free individual variables; (b) 4 contains just one predicate letter, and it is dyadic; (c) for every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that, when the predicate letter in 4 is interpreted as expressing H, 4 comes to agree in truth-value with 'x bears R to y'
for all values of 'x' and 'y'.
For each choice of R, one symmetric relation H which proves to be suited to the above purpose is the relation which relates, backwards and forwards, all and only the following natural numbers, for all choices of z: z with z + 1, z + 2, and 62; 62 with itself; and 62 + 1 with 6w + 1 for all w and with 6u + 4 for all u to which z bears R. In other words, writing 'g' to mean 'congruent modulo 6,' we may describe H as the relation of any natural number x t o any natural number y such that (1) x = y S 0, or (2) x E y S 1 , o r (3) y = 6x, or (4) x = 6y, or (5) y = x + 1 , o r (6) x = y + 1,or (7) y = x + 2, or (8) x = y + 2 , o r (9) x e 1, y % 4 , a n d Q ( x -1) bears R toQ(y -4)) or (10) y g 1 , x g 4 , a n d Q ( y -1) bears R t o i ( x -4).
Interpreting 'Hxy' accordingly as meaning that at least one of the conditions (1)-(10) holds, we proceed now to show R definable. (In effect we proceed to the construction of a 4 fulfilling (a)-(c).)
To begin with we shall show how the familiar notation 'x = y', used above in the informal explanation of H, can be formally defined on the basis of H . The arrow '+' is used as a sign of definition.
Definition: x = y + (z) (Hxz = Hyz). Justification: Under equality of x and y, obviously (z) (Hxz = Hyz) ; so it will be sufficient to establish the converse-to assume that (z)(Hxz 5 Hyz) and
show that x and y must be equal. By (3)) x bears H to 62; so, by our assumption, y must bear H to 6s. Now we see from a survey of (1)-(10) that y, in order to bear H to 62 (which r 0), must be either 62 or 36s or x or 6s + 1 or 6x -1 or 6x + 2 or 6x -2. But, for any natural number x, each of these seven alternatives is greater than or equal to x. (Where x is 0, the alternatives 6x -1and 62 -2 of course drop out as non-existent.) So y 2 x. But the same argument with 'x' and 'y' switched shows that x 2 y. So x = y.
We next proceed to show how, now that ' = ' is a t hand, the notations 'x E 0') 'x Z 11', etc. can be defined in turn.
Definition:
Justification: What the definiens says is that x bears H to itself and to a t most six other numbers. This is true when x E0 ; for, when x E0, we know from (1)-(10) that x bears H to itself and to no other numbers except 6x, ix, x + 1, x -1, x + 2, and x -2 (indeed only to itself and 1 and 2 when x is 0). Conversely, when the definiens is true, x E 0; this is seen as follows. We see from (])-(lo) that if x bears H to itself then x E 1 or x Z 0; but if x Z 1 then (2) tells us that x bears H not to merely six other numbers but to 1,7,13,19,25, etc. ad infinitum. Definition:
Justification evident.
JustiJication: The clause 'Rxx' says in effect 'x is congruent to 2 or 3 or 4 or 5') and the rest of ths definiens may be read 'x bears H to a t most one number congruent to 0'. But we know from (3)) (5), (7)) and (8) that x bears H to 62, x + 1, x + 2, and x -2, all of which are distinct. Then, since 62 0, x will fulfill the definiens only if none of x + 1, x + 2, and x -2 is congruent to 0; hence only if x E 3. Conversely, if x 3 then we see from (1)-(10) that x will bear H to only one number E 0 (viz. 62)) thus fulfilling the definiens.
Justification: The first two clauses, 'Rxx .x g 3') say in effect 'x is congruent to 2 or 4 or 5') and the ensuing quantification amounts to: So it remains to show that (i) is true for all x congruent to 4 and false for all x congruent to 2 or 5.
Then suppose x E 4; to show that (i) holds. I.e., supposing any y and z such that Hxz and Hyz and (ii) y and z are congruent to 2 or 4 or 5, to show that x = y. Since x E 4 and Hxz, survey of (1)- (10) shows that z must be 6x or x + 1 or x -1 or x + 2 or x -2 or E 1; hence, eliminating by (ii), we conclude that z is x + 1 or x -2. Hence z g 5 or z 2 2. Then, since Hyz, survey of (1)-(10) shows that y must be Gz or z + 1 or z -1 or z + 2 or 2 -2; hence, kliminating by (ii), we conclude that y is z -1 or z + 2. So, since 2 was x + 1 or x -2, y is x or x -3 or x + 3. But if y were x -3 or x + 3 then y would be g 1, contrary to (ii). So x = y. It remains to show (i) false for all x congruent to 2 or 5. I.e., for each x congruent to 2 or 5 we have to produce a y and z such that (ii) holds and Hxz and Hyz and x # y.
Case where x E 2: Take y as x + 3 and 2 as x + 2.
Case where x Ei 5: Take y as x -3 and z as x -1.
This completes the justification of the definition of 'x g 4'.
Definition: x E2 -+ Rxx .x & 4 . (zy)(zz)(y E 3 .z S 1 .Hxy .Hyz .Hxz).
Justification: Any value of 'x' congruent to 2 obviously satisfies the definiens; for, we can take y and z as x + 1 and x -1. Moreover, any value of 'x' congruent to 0 or 1 or 4 obviously fails to satisfy the definiens, in view of the clauses '8xx .x g 4'. So what we have to show is that the rest of the definiens, viz.:
fails when x 2 3 and when x g 5.
Case where x g 3: It is clear from (1)- (10) that x bears H to nothing y congruent to 3 ; so (iii) fails.
Case where x E 5: If x is to bear H to y, and y E 3, then we know from (1)-(10) that y must be x -2. If x is to bear H to z, and z S 1, then we know from (1)-(10) that z must be x + 2. So y E 3 and z = y + 4. But then it is clear from (1)-(10) that nyz. So (iii) fails.
Justification evident, since 'nxx' excludes congruence to 0 and 1. I t is now possible to define successor.
Justification: It is evident from an examination of (1)- (10) that, in the case where x E 1, y will be x + 1if and only if Hxy and y S 2. Correspondingly for the cases where x E 2 , 3 , or 4. So our definition clearly serves its purpose except perhaps where x g 5 or x 0. Where x E 5, y need not be x + 1 in order that Hxy and y E 0; for y could be 6x. Where x S 0, again, y need not be x + 1in order that Hxy and y g 1; for y could be Qx. I t is in order to eliminate these unwanted alternatives 6x and &x that the supplementary clauses:
(~z ) ( z E 4 . .HYZ), (32)(2 E 5 .Hxz .Hyz) have been inserted in the above definiens. It is clear from (6) and (8) that (iv) does hold when x E 5 and y = x + 1, and that (v) holds when x g 0 and y = x + 1;for we can take z in both cases as x -1. So in order to complete the justification of our definition it remains only to show that (iv) fails when x % 5 and y = 62, and that (v) fails when x E 0 and y = tx.
Where z L2 4, we know from (1)-(10) that z bears H only to 62, z + 1, z -1, z + 2, z -2, and perhaps various numbers g 1.Of all these, clearly no two can be x and 62 where x L2 5. So (iv) fails when x G 5 and y = 6x.
Where z S 5, z will bear H only to 6.2, z + 1, z -1,z + 2, and z -2; and clearly no two of these can be x and &x. So (v) fails when y = 32.
So the definition of 'y = x + 1' is justified. We next define 'y = x + 4' and 'y = x + 6' in obvious fashion.
I t is now possible to define multiplication by 6.
Justification: The definiens says, in brief, that
In view of (3)) clearly (vi) holds when y is 6x. So it remains conversely to assume (vi) and show that y must be 6%. Since y G 0 and-Hxy, we know from (1)-(10) that (vii) y i s x o r 6 x 0 r Q x 0 r x + 1 0 r x -1 0 r x + 2 o r x -2. Also, since y + 6 0 and H(x + l)(y + 6)) we know from (1)-(10) that y + 6 i s x + 1 or62 + 6 o r & ( x+ 1) o r x + 2 o r x o r x + 3 o r x -l ; b u t , by (vi) y + 6 # x + 1;so (viii) y is 62 or t(x + 1) -6 or x -4 or x -6 or x -3 or x -7.
But it is readily verified that there can be no x such that either x or i x or x + 1 o r x -1 o r x + 2 o r x -2 i s e q u a l t o & ( x + 1) -6 o r x -4 o r x -6 o r x -3 or x -7; so (vii) and (viii) compel y to be 62.
We are a t last ready to express 'Rxy'.
Justification: The definiens says, in brief, that 6x + 1 bears H to 6y + 4. But since 62 + 1 E 1and 6y + 4 g 4, we see from a survey of (1)-(10) that 6x + 1 will bear H to 6y + 4 if and only if (9) holds (with '62 3. 1' for 'x' therein and '6y + 4' for 'y'); i.e., if and only if &(6x+ 1 -1) bears R to t(6y + 4 -4);
i.e., if and only if x bears R to y.
The proof of Theorem I is now complete. 'Rxy' expands through the above dozen definitions into a formula I$ of pure quantification theory, or first-order functional calculus, having dyadic 'H' as sole predicate letter and 'x' and 'y' as sole free individual variables. Given any relation R of natural numbers, we can give 'H' a symmetric interpretation (viz. as in (1)-(10)) which will cause t$ to agree in truth-value with 'x bears R to y' for all values of 'x' and 'y', as has been established by the justifications of the twelve definitions.
2. Consequences concerning decidability. Kalm&rl has presented an effective method whereby, given any formula J, of quantification theory, or first-order functional calculus, another such formula J,' can be found which meets the following conditions: J,' contains just one predicate letter, and that letter is dyadic; and J, is valid if and only if J,' is valid.
With help of Theorem I we can strengthen Kalmkr's result to read as follows: THEOREM 11. There is an eflective method whereby, given any formula J, of quantification theory, a formula x of quantification theory can be found which meets the following conditions: x contains just one predicate letter, and that letter is dyadic; and J, is valid if and only if x comes out true under all symmetric interpretations of its predicate letter in all non-empty universes.
Proof. We construct x as follows. Given J,, we first apply KalmAr's method to obtain a formula J,' whose sole predicate letter is dyadic 'R'. 137-144. As actually stated by him, KalmBr's method accomplishes the reduction of a formula tC. of quantification theory to a formula $' of quantification theory meeting the conditions that $' contains just one predicate letter, that that letter is dyadic, and that $is satisfiable if and only if $' is satisfiable; however, as is well known, this is easily modified to yield the reduction method described in the text by making use of the equivalence between validity of a formula and unsatisfiability of its negation. A/Ioreover, KalmAr's procedure begins with a preliminary reduction of the given formula to a formula in prenex normal form with a prefix of specified form, and in the further reduction to a formula having a single binary predicate letter in the matrix the same form of prefix is preserved. Thus KalmBr's result is stronger than our present purpose requires. A proof of the (weaker) result stated in the text, by a reduction method which is independent of reduction of the prefix to a ~pecial form, will also appear in the forthcoming revised and enlarged edition of under all symmetric interpretations of 'H'). Conversely, we know from Theorem I that for every interpretation of 'R' there is a symmetric interpretation of 'H' which makes 4 a necessary and sufficient condition for 'Rxy'; so, if x is true for all symmetric interpretations of 'H'; +' is true for all interpretations of 'R'.
This completes the proof of Theorem 11.
Church3 has proved the impossibility of a decision procedure for quantification theory. Combining this result with KalmBr's, we know that there can be no decision procedure even for the quantification theory of a single dyadic predicate letter. But now Theorem I1 leads, by parallel reasoning, to:
THEOREM 111. There can be no decision procedure for the quantiJication theory of a dyadic predicate letter 'H' even when no distinction i s made between 'Hxy' and 'Hyx' (nor in general between 'Ha/3' and 'H/3a1).
The undecidability of quantification theory depends essentially on the presence of polyadic predicate letters; for, since Lowenheim we have known decision procedures for monadic quantification theory.* However, Theorem I11 shows that the undecidability of quantification theory does not depend upon the existence of non-symmetric interpretations of the predicate letters.
As an immediate consequence (little more than a restatement of Theorems I1 and I11 in a different phraseology) we have also:
COROLLARY. a n There i s a n effective method whereby the problem of validity of arbitrary formula of quantification theory (or Logik, ibid., vol. 99 (1928) , pp. 342-372; Jacques Herbrand, Recherches sur la th6orie d e la d6monstration (Warsaw, 1930) , Chapter 2, $9.2. For convenient expositions of these procedures and further variants, see also Hilbert and Ackermann, op. cit., Chapter 3, $12; Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik, vol. I , pp. 193-195; G. H . von Wright, Form and content in logic (Cambridge, England, 1949, 35 pp.) ; Quine, 0 sentido da nova logica (Sbo Paulo, 1914) , pp. 126-129; O n the logic of quantification, this JOURNAI,, vol. 10 (1945) , pp. 1-12; Methods of logic, pp. [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] [114] [115] [116] [117] [192] [193] [194] ; Church, Introduction fo mathematical logic I, revised edition, $46. quantification theory except that the predicate letters are allowed in quantifiers, as bound variables. Alternatively, instead of writing 'Fx', 'Fy', etc., we may prefer to write 'x a f', 'y a f', etc. and think of 'f'thus as a class variable.'
This theory, however one may care to frame and name it, is known to admitlike monadic quantification theory itself-of a decision pr~cedure.~ However, we can now show that if the theory is supplemented to the extent merely of allowing one unquantifiable monadic second-level predicate letter, standing for predicates of classes, then the resulting theory admits no decision procedure.
THEOREM IV. There can be no decision procedure for the theory which consists of elementary set theory plus an unquantiJiable monadic second-level predicate letter. Or, in the terminology of Church,' there is no solution of the decision problem for the monadic functional calculus of third order, or even of the decision problem for the subclass of formulas of the monadic functional calculus of third order in which there do not occur more than one functional variable of the highest type.
Proof. One of the formulas falling within the notation of the theory under consideration is :
wherein 'K' figures as a second-level predicate letter. Since '(g)(z r g 3 x a g)' is equivalent to ' z = x', (i) says in effect merely that 'K' is true of the class {x, y } whose members are x and y. So, if we are given any symmetric relation H and then interpret 'K' as true of just the classes {x, y} such that x bears H to y, thereupon (i) becomes a necessary and sufficient condition that x bear H to y. Conversely, also, for every interpretation of 'K' there is a symmetric relation H (viz. ?jl(K{x, y))) such that (i) is a necessary and sufficient condition that x bear H to y. Therefore, if throughout a formula of quantification theory we supplant 'Hxy' by (i) (and correspondingly supplant 'HaP1 for all variables a and P), then the resulting formula will be true for all interpretations of 'K' if and only if the original was true for all symmetric interpretations of 'H'. Accordingly Theorem IV follows from Theorem 111.
3.
A simplest primitive for elementary number theory. Mrs. Robinson has shown8 that elementary number theory can be expressed in terms of just the predicates of divisibility ('x is a factor of y') and succession ('x = y + 1') together with identity, quantification, and the truth functions. However, all of her primitives can be generated from a single symmetric dyadic predicate together with quantification and the truth-functions, if we follow the construc- tions in $1above, interpreting 'Rxy' as ' x is a factor of y'. We have an appropriate predicate for the purpose when we construe 'Hxy' according to (1)- (10) of §1 above, with 'bears R to' changed to 'is a factor of'. Thus THEOREM V. Elementary number theory can be expressed in terms of just quantifiation and the truth-functions and a single symmetric dyadic predic~te.~ Note that the above interpretation of 'H' can be described briefly as the relation which relates, backwards and forwards, for all choices of z and w, all and only the following natural numbers: z with z + 1, z + 2, and 62; 62 with itself; and 62 + 1with 6w + 1and 6zw + 4.
If a symmetric dyadic predicate be thought of as simpler than a non-symmetric one, and if the next higher stage of simplicity be conceived to consist in a multitude of monadic predicates,1° then we have here achieved the simplest possible primitive for elementary number theory within the framework of quantification theory. For, it will now be shown that no set of monadic predicates can suffice for elementary number theory. Proof. Let 'Tx' mean that the formula numbered x in a given Godel numbering1' of quantification theory is a theorem of quantification theory. Then, as is clear from Godel's work, 'Tx' is expressible in elementary number theory, and furthermore a finite set of axioms of number theory can be given from which each instance of 'Tx' (with a numeral for 'x') can, if and only if true, be deduced. Let us abbreviate the conjunction of those axioms as 'A'. Now deduction from 'A' proceeds in turn purely by quantification theory. Hence a formula 4 of quantification theory is a theorem of quantification theory if and only if the number-theoretic statement ' A 3 Tx', with the Godel numeral of 4 in place of 'x', is itself quantificationally valid (i.e., valid for quantification theory independently of the number-theoretic interpretation of the primitive predicates). Moreover, if we can expand ' A 3 Tx' (with the aforementioned numeral in place of 'x') into a primitive notation B involving none but monadic predicates then we can decide its quantificational validity; for, a decision procedure is available for the quantification theory of monadic predicates.4 We thus achieve a decision procedure for recognizing theorems of quantification theory in general. But Godel has shown12 that all,valid formulas of quantification theory are theorems; so this decision procedure amounts to a decision procedure for validity ir. quantification theory. But Church has shown3 that no such procedure is possible. Our assumption regarding O is therefore wrong.
9 A reduction of elementary number theory to a single non-symmetric dyadic predicate was given by John R. Myhill, A reduction i n the number of primitive ideas of arithmetic, this JOURNAL, vol. 15 (1950) Theorem 111, it will be recalled, was proved with help of Kalmhr's theorem. But in conclusion it may be worth noting that by following the line rather of the proof of Theorem VI we could obtain a new proof of Theorem I11 not presupposing Kalmsr's work. The argument is as follows. If, contrary to Theorem 111, there were a decision procedure for the quantification theory of a single symmetric dyadic predicate, then the argument of Theorem VI could be repeated with the mere change, twice, of "monadic predicates" to "a single symmetric dyadic predicate." This argument would establish (in place of Theorem VI) the impossibility of basing elementary number theory on a single symmetric dyadic predicate, contrary to Theorem V. So Theorem I11 follows. Theorem IV, which was proved from Theorem 111,then likewise becomes independent of Kalmdr's argument.
